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TThe main focus of the study is the analysis of the effects of the regulatory changes on the level of local governments that have taken place in the past decade, and it explores the management and expected development 
trends in one of the segments with the largest 
population, towns with county rights. 
over the nearly thirty years since the politi-
cal transition, the system of local governments 
in Hungary has faced a lot of challenges and 
difficulties. The history of local governments 
has not followed a steady development path, 
there have been distinctive stages, some of 
them critical, but we now typically see sound 
management at local governments. 
The study analyses the situation of the Hun-
garian local government system, with a spe-
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cial focus on the management of towns with 
county rights and on the current development 
policy environment, while also evaluating the 
role of the state Audit office of Hungary in 
improving the management of local govern-
ments. 
The study provides an overview of past 
events and of the systems-based features of 
the current situation, i.e. the process in which 
local governments (especially those of towns 
with county rights), once passive stakehold-
ers in public finances, turned into active eco-
nomic entities that perform public services, 
shaping their environment. 
THE sHAdows of THE PAsT:  
THE lITErATUrE on THE IndEbTEdnEss 
of loCAl govErnMEnTs And  
THE rEgUlATIon of THEIr oPErATIon  
In An InTErnATIonAl ConTExT 
To put our focus area in context, we start 
discussing literature with the theory of fiscal 
federalism. This group of theories evolved in 
federal states, but its results provided a pattern 
that could also be applied in unitary states and 
supranational organisations like the European 
union. A key message of this group of theories 
is how tasks should be distributed between the 
central and the local level, what powers local 
authorities should have and to what degree, 
i.e. how to set the limits of their operation and 
their degree of independence in management. 
The issue of indebtedness and debt control is 
a part of this.
In literature, indebtedness is traced back to 
several causes and aspects. The study of Beck 
and Stone (2017) analyses the factors that in-
fluence the local governments’ ability to con-
tinue their operation, i.e. the principle of go-
ing concern in accounting. The study reflects 
on the fact that there are signs of bankruptcy 
that are objective and noticeable for the citi-
zens. A local government is considered dys-
functional when it fails to adapt to changes 
and cannot provide public services the way 
taxpayers expect it to. In addition, the study 
examines what factors have an impact on the 
bankruptcy of a local government, how effec-
tive governmental initiatives are in tackling or 
preventing these situations.
De Vicente Lama (Vicente et al., 2017) 
pointed out an interesting aspect in her study. 
The study assessed the accounting consolida-
tion of the companies of spanish municipali-
ties, and the effects of this consolidation. The 
authors found that municipal companies may 
be used to ‘hide’ municipal budget deficit 
outside the budget, and, as a result, to make 
the financial situation of the local government 
look better than it actually is. 
In the united states, the essence of tax in-
crement financing (TIf) in the development 
financing of local governments is that current 
bond issues by local governments provide re-
sources for development and renovation, and 
the resulting increase in the value of real prop-
erty is covered by the increase of real property 
taxes. These did not result in high indebted-
ness after the financial crisis, as local govern-
ments could increase their tax revenues at a 
sufficient pace (Luby, Moldogaziev, 2014).
Sági (2015) and sági, Tóth (2009) exam-
ined the role of and relationship between the 
central governance and municipalities, and 
municipalities and banks. They found that as 
the treasury system was implemented at local 
governments, financial flows of institutions 
became easier to plan and monitor. In addi-
tion, there was a considerable improvement in 
stakeholders getting up-to-date information, 
especially regarding liquidity. 
If we examine indebtedness internation-
ally, we see that besides changes in public ad-
ministration, changing international financial 
markets also had a significant impact on the 
indebtedness of local governments. This is due 
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to the fact that in the 1960s and 1970s, bor-
rowing became popular because of the low in-
terest rates, and as a result local governments 
were really active on the credit market.  This 
process was enhanced by the negative real 
borrowing rates in the 1980s, which discour-
aged saving and increased debt financing. The 
resulting repayment obligations later led to 
a decline in investments in the 1990s (Hal-
mosi, 2005). This was particularly an issue in 
Germany, where, after the reunification, the 
federal state took over the debt of local gov-
ernments (Dohnanyi, 2002).
In Italy, permissive regulations did not take 
into account that debt financing was not only 
used for investments, but was suitable for cov-
ering operating deficit, and this process led 
to the point when local governments were in 
a debt trap in 1976. The Italian convergence 
programme in the mid-1990s could only re-
duce the debt of local governments (Halmosi, 
2005).
The main point of budgetary control is that 
there is a certain, strict or lax, state-level debt 
control, which Dafflon (2010) calls the golden 
rule of financing. under the golden rule, lo-
cal governments can only use current revenues 
and tax revenues for their operational expend-
iture, while they can use long-term loans or 
their equity or the combination of the two to 
finance investments. Differences among coun-
tries in terms of debt control only exist with 
regard to the upper limit of indebtedness. one 
practical reason for the use of the golden rule 
of a balanced budget is that as it regulates the 
accumulation of fixed assets, public services 
provided by local governments will be accessi-
ble to several generations. This means that the 
focus should be on intergenerational distribu-
tion in financing as well (Heijdra, Meijdam, 
2002).
from an operational approach, there are 
three known ways of controlling the indebt-
edness and borrowing of local governments. 
In the first case there is market financing, 
where market discipline is dominant, in the 
second case administrative measures are taken 
to make borrowing subject to approval, and 
in the third case, borrowing is effectively re-
stricted according to certain variables by cen-
tral regulations (Ter-Minassian, craig, 1997). 
The regulatory basis of maintaining govern-
ment deficit in the Eu was examined by Van 
Rompuy et al. within the stability and Growth 
Pact, and they also analysed it in the local sub-
system of oEcD member states (Van Rom-
puy, 2016). Monacelli et al. (2016) and Bur-
ret and Feld (2018) described how fiscal rules 
work through Italian and swiss examples. 
These rules are important also because they 
guarantee the liquidity of local governments 
and the going concern principle on micro and 
macro level as well (Duve, Dreschsler, 2011). 
Foremny (2014) examined the applicability 
of fiscal rules in the period before the crises 
and concluded that despite the rules, financial 
equilibrium was not always maintained—this 
was confirmed by Levaggi and Zanola (2003) 
through the example of Italian regions.
HUngArIAn loCAl govErnMEnTs 
AfTEr THE PolITICAl TrAnsITIon  
And TodAy
The councils Act, which came into effect 
in the 1950s, disrupted the system of lo-
cal governments in Hungary, as it basically 
eliminated local autonomy, which is shown by 
the fact that it considered local authorities as 
de-concentrated bodies besides the centralised 
state system. The role of county councils were 
stronger, as it was clear in the ‘distribution’ 
and financing of investments as well, yet 
their competence was limited, as they had no 
substantial influence on central decisions.
After the political transition, counties were 
marginalised, and an atomistic local govern-
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ment structure evolved, where the focus was 
on municipal governments. The history of 
local governments in Hungary after the po-
litical transition can be analysed from several 
aspects. These include the methods of regula-
tion, the provision of funding, the evolution 
of public tasks and the financial situation. In 
view of this, the history of the local govern-
ment system in Hungary since 1990 can be 
divided into four stages (see Table 1), which 
were significantly influenced by international 
factors as well. These include the accession to 
the European union and the global financial 
crisis that started in 2007 and reached Hun-
gary in 2008. In addition to internal features, 
these factors had a great impact on the devel-
opment of the local government system and 
its elements.
After 1990, the management of local gov-
ernments was developed according to New 
Public Management, the prevalent trend of 
the era. This meant that local authorities were 
given considerable independence, including 
organisational structures and the freedom to 
organise services. In this period, some restric-
tive rules were introduced, but due to the 
generally lax control and weak budgetary dis-
cipline, these were not enforced. What made 
the situation even worse was that an increas-
ing number of tasks were transferred from the 
central public administration to local govern-
ments without providing sufficient resources 
either in nominal or in real terms, which led 
to an operating deficit from the start.
The first turning point came in 1996, when 
restrictive elements appeared in economic reg-
ulations, as the debt settlement procedure was 
introduced. The primary aim was to clearly 
define responsibilities in the crisis manage-
ment of the operation of local governments. 
This was when the borrowing limit was codi-
fied, but it did not have the intended effect, as 
the supreme institution for the external audit-
ing of public finances, the state Audit office 
of Hungary, could only indicate a breach but 
could not impose real sanctions.
After the Eu accession in 2004, quality re-
quirements regarding the tasks of local gov-
ernments increased, but no internal resources 
(from the central budget) were provided for 
this, especially after the 2006 convergence 
programme. 
Table 1
Features oF the local government system aFter the political transition,  
in stages
stages no. of tasks Financing regulation
1990–1996 As provided for in the local 
governments Act
dominant role of state subsidies 
and contributions
very little in the economic field
1996–2004 Increasing tasks and quality 
requirements
decreasing state subsidies debt settlement, introduction of a 
borrowing limit
2004–2010 decentralisation decreasing state subsidies, 
increasing own revenues, external 
resources
no meaningful reaction to the 
situation
2011–Present recentralisation own revenues are important, task 
financing
Introduction of debt rules and 
budgetary rules
Source: own research (2019)
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The causes of  indebtedness
‘In theory’, the 2004 Eu accession promised 
a long-term increase in municipal investments 
in Hungary. However, resource-poor local 
governments did not have sufficient funds 
of their own for drawing down development 
resources, and they adopted the bridging 
solution proposed by the government and 
used bank funding, mostly in foreign currency, 
as own contribution. The 2006 (austerity) 
programme to adjust the convergence path, 
which tried to decrease the budgetary deficit 
by curtailing the education and health care 
systems and cutting the resources provided 
to local governments, only exacerbated the 
problem. However, economic conditions and 
borrowing limits were not settled satisfactorily. 
After 2006, the debts of local governments 
increased (see Figure 1), mostly because of 
the foreign currency bonds issued and the 
foreign currency loans taken, especially as the 
increasing crisis led to the quick depreciation 
of the forint after 2007, which meant 
debt payments increased significantly and 
repayment seemed less and less attainable. The 
state Audit office of Hungary also predicted 
the risks arising from this, but had no power 
to do more. After 2006, we see an ‘irreversible’ 
indebtedness process as far as long-term 
liabilities are concerned, even though short 
term debts decreased to an extremely low 
level. After the Eu accession, in the first 
full programming period (2007–2014), lo-
cal governments became the recipients of 
resources of approximately Huf 1,500–2,000 
billion. The programmes, however, were 
mostly aimed at infrastructure development, 
but the returns on municipal investments did 
not cover the amounts payable to banks in 
connection with the developments. Typically 
local governments couldn’t even provide 
the operating costs of the investments that 
had been carried out. The chronic lack of 
the required own contribution and the use 
of bank loans to secure resources led to the 
indebtedness of local governments, which 
became more vulnerable and this process had 
a negative impact on the stability of public 
finances in general. for example, the 2011 
government debt target was not met because 
of the debts of local governments.
The sAo found that the main motivation 
for issuing bonds was to settle existing debts 
and, primarily, to secure the own contribu-
tion required for investments co-financed by 
the Eu. one indicator of this is that no sec-
ondary market developed for the bonds, they 
were subscribed by the account providing 
banks, which means this can be considered as 
‘hidden’ borrowing. The reason for local gov-
ernments securing resources by issuing bonds 
was that, as opposed to borrowing, there was 
no obligation to conduct a public procure-
ment procedure for bond issues and also there 
were talks about a future tightening of bor-
rowing regulations (which later proved to be 
unfounded) and local governments tried to 
avoid that in time. Atypical features included 
extremely long maturity, capital repayment 
moratorium in the first few years, foreign 
currency denomination (mostly cHf) and 
the lower interest rates it entailed. 50 percent 
of debts were not assigned to accumulation 
goals, contrary to the logic of economics, and 
until 2009, accumulation expenditure had 
been decreasing.
Kovács, Csillik (2012) examined the local 
governments’ exposure to financial institu-
tions and the composition by currency. In 
their study they also found that the total net 
financial assets of local governments increased 
after 2010, turning from negative to positive.
considerable imbalances emerged in the 
operational and accumulation budget and the 
overall management of the local government 
system. In the local government system, there 
was a lack of operational and accumulation re-
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sources, and as a result exposure to banks was 
increasing as wage, liquidity and credit agree-
ments were regularly renewed. At the end of 
2010, ongoing investments were burdened 
with future liabilities of Huf 1,154 billion. 
Another substantial problem was supplier fi-
nancing, which became widespread and was 
used by local authorities as a form of exter-
nal financing in the operational budget. These 
risks were also confirmed by the sAo’s analy-
ses. These established that exposure to banks 
was increasing, and that no reserves had been 
established to deal with this, there were no 
sufficient funds, and, as a result, the local gov-
ernment sector carried risks for the national 
economy (Domokos, 2011; state Audit office 
of Hungary, 2012).
These circumstances together led to the 
development of a decentralised debt outside 
of the central budget, at local governments. 
As a result, the financial capacity of local gov-
ernments, which is the indicator of financial 
sustainability, became negative (Domokos, 
2012). In practice, this means that local au-
thorities could not even finance their existing 
debts, as the surplus of the operational budget 
did not cover the annual debt service. This 
would have directly led to bankruptcy for sev-
eral local governments. Debts and financial 
difficulties developed unevenly, as different 
types of settlements faced different financial 
risks. Towns with county rights incurred con-
siderable debts, their revenue structure was 
relatively stable. However, county local gov-
ernments and small towns without substantial 
tax base could not fulfil the obligations arising 
from their increasing tasks. The fact that the 
costs of human public services increased and 
state subsidies covered only a fraction of that 
was highly instrumental in this.
Figure 1
external sources oF local governments
Source: Edited by the authors based on Mnb data (2019)
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The two factors, the development of the 
accumulation deficit and of the operational 
deficit posed significant risks in themselves, 
and after 2012, the government believed the 
solution was debt consolidation.
Another problem was posed by opera-
tional difficulties. Figure 2 shows the budget 
balance of local authorities, and it is clear 
that the aggregated budget balance of the 
local governments was often negative in the 
1990s already, but in the 2000s, the balance 
was negative every year with the exception 
of 2008.
The analysis of the budget balance also re-
vealed that among the sources of revenue, ex-
ternal, i.e. debt financing was becoming more 
and more prevalent, which is a symptom of 
the debt trap.
Local governments in the new regulatory 
environment
Within the period examined, the fourth stage 
started in 2010. The active engagement of the 
government with its economic policy started 
in 2011 with the debt consolidation, which, 
in four stages, took over all bank debts before 
31 December 2013. 
2011 was another turning point in the reg-
ulation of the indebtedness of local govern-
ments, which affected tasks, competences and 
financing, and rule-based budgetary practice 
became more prevalent. The new Local Gov-
ernment Act was also passed this year. 
Figure 3 shows to what extent the sector was 
compliant with the provisions of the budget-
ary rule. The values were calculated as follows: 
Figure 2
Budget Balance oF local governments  
in hungary
Source: Edited by the authors based on oECd data (2019) 
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the debt of local governments was divided by 
local tax revenues, which are a crucial part of 
own revenues. Management experience shows 
that local tax revenues amount to 90–95 per-
cent of the local governments’ own revenues, 
with local business tax being very important, 
amounting to approximately 85 percent of 
local taxes. This means our calculations are 
stricter than legal regulations, as some sources 
of own revenue are disregarded.
We assessed how the ratio of debt and local 
tax revenues changed after 2011, as this was 
the year the stability Act came into force, in-
troducing this ratio, setting 50 percent as the 
upper limit for–each–local government. The 
ratio was 219 percent in 2011, then declined 
to 32 percent in 2014 and to 26 percent in 
2015. In 2016 and 2017, the rate increased 
again, but was still below the 50 percent toler-
ance margin (it was 48 percent and 48.5 per-
cent). This means that on a sectoral level, local 
governments complied with the debt limit.
The role of  the State Audit Office 
of  Hungary after the changes in the 
management of  local governments
As a result of legislative changes, the sAo 
had more control (see Table 2) and its audits 
covered new areas, including corruption and 
integrity risks (Pulay, Lucza, 2018; Németh et 
al., 2018). In addition to the issues examined, 
audits now also focus on risks arising from 
monetary and budgetary management (Pulay 
et al., 2017). 
The stability Act and the regulations laid 
down in the Act on the Local Governments 
of Hungary made borrowing by local govern-
ments subject to approval, but not the devel-
Figure 3
compliance with the Budgetary rule
Source: own calculations based on oECd data (2019)
debt / local tax revenue
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opments co-financed by the European union. 
However, new investments launched by local 
authorities cannot be financed from debt if the 
annual debt service is more than 50 percent of 
own revenues, which is a significantly stricter 
regulation than the previous one. Another ele-
ment of the debt rule is that borrowing by local 
government-owned companies is also subject 
to approval, which is to prevent entities per-
forming tasks outside the central budget from 
becoming indebted. The amendment coming 
into force in 2019 allows the owner local gov-
ernment to provide guarantees at projects that 
are significant for the national economy. It is to 
promote the budgetary golden rule that no op-
erational deficit may be planned in the budget. 
In addition to the National Assembly, the state 
Audit office of Hungary also played an im-
portant role in the creation of legal regulations 
(Domokos, 2016). After 2010, it was realised 
in the local government system that the cur-
rent structure needed to be reformed – this was 
already seen necessary earlier, especially after 
the Eu accession, but there was no mandate to 
match the political will to implement such re-
forms. The previous local government system, 
just like the system created after the political 
transition, took general trends and tendencies 
into consideration.
These are:
•	achieving economies of scale in the 
framework of task performance,
•	centralisation of tasks,
•	implementation of budget rules, enhanced 
control,
•	reform of the financing structure (see the 
last row of Table 1).
The role of the state Audit office of Hun-
gary was also strengthened, it was given the 
power to sanction with respect to state subsi-
dies, and it is clear that its role was adapted to 
the changing environment. certain audit and 
research recommendations of the sAo con-
tribute to the continuous change of the regula-
tory environment, which are transposed to le-
gal regulations (for example when the stability 
Act was extended to cover local government-
owned companies). New legal regulations al-
low the sAo to audit state-owned and local 
government-owned companies as well. This 
was an important measure, as for good pub-
lic sector management it is necessary to create 
and appropriately maintain a professional en-
vironment for task performance (Domokos et 
al., 2016, Domokos et al., 2015). 
Material and methodology 
When discussing literature, we relied on 
the oEcD database: we examined the key 
macroeconomic indicators of the Hungarian 
local government system and we did 
calculations regarding compliance with the 
Table 2
the tools oF the state audit oFFice oF hungary 
prohibitive guiding
Keeping operational deficit under control Efficient closing of debt settlement procedures
Monitoring indebtedness decreasing integrity risks
Auditing investments Initiating changes in regulation
Enhanced supervision of the regulatory environment and 
sanctioning
scientific activities
Source: own research, 2018
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debt rule. In the empirical part of our research, 
we reviewed the consolidated debt of county 
local governments with a time series analysis, 
with intensity ratio and per population. In 
the analysis of towns with county rights, we 
conducted a time series analysis on balance 
sheet and income statement data with chain 
and fixed-base indices. our analysis starts with 
2014, as this was the year when the new public 
accounting regulation was introduced, and at 
the time of writing, 2017 is the last closed 
year, so the analysis does not include changes 
in assets induced by debt consolidation (e.g. 
taking over hospital assets). To compile the 
database of the Modern cities Programme, we 
conducted document analysis on the available 
legal sources, and we conducted a time series 
analysis on these data. 
CAsE sTUdy of Towns wITH CoUnTy 
rIgHTs
Debt consolidation
The process of debt consolidation had four 
stages, and it was the last two that had a 
significant impact on towns with county 
rights: the assumption of debt in 2013 and the 
last such measure in 2014. In 2013, the base 
of the tax consolidation was proportionate to 
the tax capacity of the settlements, and as such 
the assumption of debts by the state in the 
2013 consolidation stage was differentiated, 
its volume was bigger in case of settlements 
with lower tax capacity and it was lower for 
settlements with higher tax capacity. The 
latter included towns with county rights. In 
2014, the government made a decision to take 
over all debts, and the consolidated amounts 
changed accordingly (see Table 3). 
Debt consolidation was the most signifi-
cant in the case of towns with county rights, 
as in the two stages, it amounted to a total 
of Huf 372.768 billion. In the first stage, in 
2013, Huf 238 billion was assumed, while 
in the second stage, in 2014, the remaining 
Huf 134.8 billion was also taken over. These 
are significant amounts, especially when we 
consider the numbers in the next chapter.
The analysis of the consolidated amounts 
reveals that in the 2013 consolidation stage 
Huf 10.344 billion was assumed per settle-
ment on average, the median was Huf 9.452 
billion. In the second stage of the consolida-
tion, in 2014, these values were Huf 5.862 
billion and Huf 4.752 billion, respectively. 
The average of the total amount was Huf 
16.207 billion, and the average of the median 
value was Huf 15.116 billion.
The per capita amount of debt taken over is 
indicative of the intensity of debt assumption. 
This value was the highest in Dunaújváros, 
Hódmezővásárhely and Pécs.
The consolidation also improved the li-
quidity, debt service and revenue autonomy 
positions of local authorities. The reason for 
this is that instead of paying the foreign cur-
rency denominated debt, a larger part of the 
revenues of the towns could be used for other 
purposes. As a result, revenues could be used 
as own contribution in aid procedures and for 
financing operation. In addition, the predict-
ability of management also improved with the 
consolidation, as it eliminated the exchange-
rate risk, which had a huge impact on finan-
cial planning security at local authorities. 
Property management at towns with 
county rights after the consolidation
The left axis of Figure 4 shows fixed assets that 
belong to national assets and equity, while the 
right axis shows the balance sheet total, i.e. 
the value of total assets. 
The assets of county local governments in-
creased by 21 percent in the period examined, 
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and these assets are significant relative to the 
GDP as well, as they amount to 7–8 percent 
of it. The asset growth is a positive process 
in itself, but its causes need to be explored 
to understand its content. What caused this 
growth was that the value of liquid assets in-
creased continuously and quadrupled between 
2015 and 2017. on the other hand, it was 
an atypical feature of the 2006–2010 indebt-
edness process that as debts increased, so did 
Table 3
deBt consolidation in speciFic settlements
town 
total 
consolidation of 
settlements with a 
population over 5 
thousand in 2013 
(assumed and 
paid)
total 
consolidation in 
2014 (assumed 
and paid)
amount of 
consolidated debt
per capita 
consolidated 
amount (thousand 
huF/person)
békéscsaba 6,002,031 3,920,774 9,922,804 160.0
debrecen 18,072,173 10,103,459 28,175,633 137.5
dunaújváros 10,843,491 5,695,756 16,539,247 339.7
Eger 4,831,453 3,401,550 8,233,003 151.1
Érd 8,093,088 3,364,343 11,457,430 175.0
Győr 3,392,210 4,455,919 7,848,129  62.1
Hódmezővásárhely 15,650,835 6,891,340 22,542,175 485.9
Kaposvár 13,987,452 5,706,299 19,693,751 297.9
Kecskemét 9,152,404 7,631,905 16,784,309 149.6
Miskolc 25,661,751 10,495,978 36,157,730 217.5
nagykanizsa 4,127,728 2,210,802 6,338,530 128.2
nyíregyháza 12,123,347 6,707,927 18,831,275 158.0
Pécs 29,227,423 16,519,422 45,746,846 300.1
salgótarján 2,090,110 1,167,397 3,257,507  84.8
sopron 11,455,657 4,103,752 15,559,409 265.5
szeged 14,075,427 11,024,642 25,100,069 151.4
székesfehérvár 9,452,942 4,752,523 14,205,465 141.9
szekszárd 3,529,058 2,414,675 5,943,733 173.8
szolnok 13,702,624 7,071,966 20,774,590 283.2
szombathely 10,638,947 4,477,818 15,116,765 193.3
Tatabánya 5,375,663 8,996,451 14,372,113 203.6
veszprém 4,987,253 2,487,933 7,475,186 129.2
Zalaegerszeg 1,448,931 1,243,940 2,692,871  45.6
Source: Edited by the authors based on data provision by the state Treasury, 2019
 focus – successes and Risks in the Hungarian Economy 
62  Public Finance Quarterly  2019/1
the value of liquid assets, which was to ensure 
liquidity, and funds deriving from bond issues 
were not immediately used, and the revenues 
from the normal operation of local govern-
ments were 'parked' in the settlement deposit 
account. However, no liquidity problems are 
detected because of the available free cash, of 
which local governments had Huf 340 bil-
lion, with additional liquid securities of Huf 
52 billion.
However, the change in the aggregate value 
of equity is significantly smaller compared to 
asset growth, as it increased by 4 percent when 
calculated with a fixed-base index. The direc-
tion of the change was not steady, as in 2016 
equity value decreased slightly (by Huf 2 bil-
lion). This negative trend did not continue in 
2017, the annual result of towns with county 
rights was positive, and this year also saw the 
highest value of the time-series. 
In public accounting, assets that ensure 
long-term operation are called fixed assets be-
longing to national assets. A major part of the 
asset item is real property, the amortisation 
of which is slow. The analysis revealed that 
the total assets of towns with county rights 
increased by Huf 200 billion, by 9 percent 
when calculated as a fixed-base index. There 
was continuous growth, but the most sig-
nificant change happened between 2014 and 
2015, which might be related to the phasing 
out of Eu resources at the end of the pro-
gramming period (2007–2013). However, 
there was no investment boom similar to the 
indebtedness boom between 2006 and 2010, 
which means that the debt brake had an ef-
Figure 4
Key indicators (Fixed assets, assets, equity) in the consolidated  
Balance sheets oF towns with county rights
Source: Edited by the authors based on state Treasury data
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fect on the investments of local governments. 
However, it is important to know if the in-
crease in fixed assets exceeds the value of rec-
ognised depreciation, since, in this case, local 
authorities suffer a net loss in assets. Based on 
2016 and 2017 data, it can be established that 
the increase in fixed assets exceeded deprecia-
tion, which means that assets were preserved 
and increased, as the net investment rate was 
positive in these years. 
Figure 5 shows receivables and liabilities 
according to the effective public accounting 
rules. The value of receivables (right scale) 
fluctuated, and it reached its lowest point in 
2016. In 2017, the major part of debt con-
cerned local tax, mostly local business tax. As 
for liabilities (left scale), liabilities due in the 
current fiscal year decreased by 66 percent, 
but liabilities due after the current fiscal year 
increased almost tenfold. In 2017, 23 percent 
of debt concerned accumulation expenditure, 
30 percent financing expenditure, and 32 per-
cent non-personnel expenses. Even though 
receivables did not fully cover liabilities, the 
securities and liquid assets described earlier 
were enough in themselves to cover liabilities. 
As a result, there are no significant liquidity 
problems in the sector.
The accounting system in effect since 2014 
brought about the transition to accrual ac-
counting. The key revenue category is the 
accrual-based accounting of activities, which 
include taxes, contributions, fees and fines, 
other revenues and revenues from the sale 
of assets (right scale). from these, revenues 
from taxes, contributions, fees and fines are 
Figure 5
Key indicators (receivaBles and liaBilities) in the consolidated  
Balance sheets oF towns with county rights
Source: Edited by the authors based on state Treasury data
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the most important. Revenues had been de-
creasing until 2016, with a decline of approx. 
Huf 20 billion. The turning point was 2017, 
when revenues almost reached the 2015 re-
sults. This can be attributed to the improving 
economic activity, and to increasing revenues 
from local business tax. The increase in other 
accrual-based revenues from shares and trans-
fers without consideration compensated the 
loss in own revenues, while support from the 
central budget remained steady over the years. 
The left scale of Figure 6 shows key budget 
support from the central budget, which de-
creased in 2015 and 2016, but started to in-
crease again in 2017. This is a positive devel-
opment in light of the fact that towns with 
county rights are required, because of their 
high tax capacity, to pay solidarity contribu-
tion, and because of the set-off system of task 
financing, they receive less support. 
It is a negative process, however, that accru-
al-based revenues from activities decreased by 
nearly Huf 23 billion. This poses a problem, 
as the operation of local governments is based 
on steady revenues and revenue autonomy. 
Results of activities correspond to the op-
erational result of corporate accounting. In 
2016, requirements regarding the content of 
the income statement changed, which had an 
effect on public accounting as well (see Figure 
7). The only result category that remained un-
changed was the result of activities, so this was 
compared in every year examined.  
Results from activities decreased until 2016 
in the period examined, so much so that the 
result of towns with county rights were nega-
Figure 6
net accrual-Based revenues From activities Between  
2014 and 2016
Source: Edited by the authors based on state Treasury data
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tive in 2016, with 10 of them making losses. 
The aggregated negative value was approx. 
Huf 6 billion. However, the trend changed 
in 2017, management in the sector was profit-
able, and the surplus covered the losses from 
the previous year.
The equity ratio is considered favourable if 
it is over 75 percent, as in this case financing 
is ensured (see Table 4). After the debt consoli-
dation, the equity ratio of towns with county 
rights significantly improved on a sectoral lev-
el, as it exceeded the desired value every year 
examined. However, it can be considered as 
a negative trend that the ratio decreased, but 
this, unlike the period before the debt consoli-
dation, is not due to increasing debts.
To substantiate this, it is worth taking 
a look at the ratio of outside capital in the 
structure of liabilities. The value is below 3 
percent, which is far from the critical 50 per-
cent, which means indebtedness is not typi-
cal among towns with county rights. The debt 
service maximum provided for in the stability 
Act was only available for 2017, when it was 
9.67 percent, which is below 50 percent, so 
this calculation also supports previous find-
ings. It can also be established that in the debt 
service index of the whole local government 
sector, the ratio of towns with county rights 
is small.  
The fixed assets ratio shows asset intensity. 
The ratio is high but has been decreasing, 
which is due to the fact that the ratio of liquid 
assets and securities have increased, decreasing 
this one.
The long-term liabilities/long-term assets 
ratio reveals the strategy of financing. Here 
some correction is required as compared to 
Figure 7
results oF activities Between  
2014 and 2016
Source: Edited by the authors based on state Treasury data, 2019 
Billion  HUF
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regular accounting categories, as certain ele-
ments are considered long-term assets (in 
liquid assets, receivables, and liabilities). The 
financing strategy is stable if this value varies 
around 1, and the tolerance margin in 3 per-
cent. Towns with county rights complied with 
this every year, which means their financing is 
stable, long-term assets are covered by long-
term liabilities. 
The liquidity ratio expresses the ability to 
repay short-term debt, and it is considered fa-
vourable if its value exceeds 2. In budgetary 
management there is no point in calculating 
quick ratio, as the inventory value is very low, 
so the liquidity ratio provides similar informa-
tion. The aggregate value of the liquidity ratio 
of towns with county rights is well above the 
required liquidity level every year – based on 
this, there are no problems with short-term li-
quidity. This is also substantiated by the value 
of the cash liquidity ratio, which exceeded 1 
considerably every year examined. 
It is important from the aspect of the struc-
ture of revenues that own revenues should be 
over 50 percent, as this is one of the corner-
stones of stable operation. In the years exam-
ined, it was only in 2017 that it was lower, in 
the other years examined it converged to the 
desired 50 percent. 
It is a negative trend that the equity growth 
rate is continuously decreasing, but the growth 
rate in 2017 covered the loss in 2016. The 
capital position of towns with county rights 
is stable and the financing position is also suf-
ficient. The liquidity of local authorities is also 
adequate. The only problems in 2016 were 
with revenue-generating ability and profitabil-
ity, but in 2017 an improving trend started.
Features of  the Modern Cities Programme 
After the debt consolidation, the management 
of local governments with county rights was 
no longer characterised by dealing with ad hoc 
problems, but by growth using predictable 
development sources from the central budget. 
The Modern cities Programme (hereinafter: 
McP) was launched in 2015, and it allocated 
approx. Huf 3,400 billion from budget 
resources and Eu aid. The programme is 
complex, as it includes the development of 
Table 4
Key accounting indices
 incides 2014 2015 2016 2017
Equity ratio (%) 94.60 92.70 86.00 80.68
liability ratio (%) 2.20 1.90 2.30 2.97
fixed assets ratio (%) 93.20 93.40 87.30 83.41
long term liabilities / long term 
assets ratio (%)
101.50 99.20 98.50 101.44
liquidity index 5.20 14.70 27.30 23.41
Cash liquidity 2.80 7.30 20.80 7.21
ratio of own revenues (%) 45.50 45.80 38.90 44
Equity growth rate (%) 5.20 1.20 –0.30 0.36
Source: Edited by the authors based on Zéman, Tóth (2015)
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transport infrastructure, the establishment of 
industrial parks and health care developments. 
As for sources of financing, we can see a multi-
channel structure, as sources are provided from 
the central budget, the Regional Development 
operational Programme and the Integrated 
Transport Development operational Prog-
ramme. 
for the empirical study, we relied on the 
allocations in the Budget Act between 2016 
and 2019, where allocations for the Modern 
cities Programme can be found, since 2017, 
in Heading XI Prime Minister’s office, title 
30 Heading-managed appropriations, chapter 
1 Targeted appropriations, budget article 78 
Modern cities Programme. from the finan-
cial envelopes it can be established that the al-
location was the highest in 2017 and in 2018, 
when support amounted to approx. Huf 150 
billion, while the appropriation in the 2019 
Budget Act was Huf 135 billion at the time 
of writing.
Figure 8 shows the amounts of budget 
support granted to local governments in the 
McP between 2016 and 2020. By the end 
of 2018 the cities that were granted the larg-
est amounts in government decrees were Érd, 
Tatabánya, Kaposvár, sopron and szeged. The 
average amount of support granted to the 
towns examined was Huf 18 billion until 
November 2017.
sopron, székesfehérvár, Nyíregyháza and 
Miskolc were granted above-average amounts, 
while Kecskemét, Veszprém, Békéscsaba, 
Nagykanizsa and Debrecen received support 
slightly below the average. Naturally, these are 
not the final numbers, as it is still an ongoing 
programme.
Figure 8
Budget resources provided For in government decrees,  
By settlement
Source: own calculation, 2018
Thousand HUF
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Table 5 shows the areas and the final 
amounts of annual support, based on govern-
ment decrees. The data reveal that the largest 
amount of support was committed in 2018, 
but as developments are in progress, these 
amounts may change.
Development areas are connected to the 
task performance of local governments and 
the central budget. In these areas the issue of 
the form of operation will be dealt with in 
the future: voluntary task performance by lo-
cal governments is an option, as it is allowed 
and provided for by the effective Local Gov-
ernment Act. However, certain development 
areas, for example infrastructure investments 
may indirectly affect operation. Developments 
in tourism and the industry may directly af-
fect the revenues of local governments, as they 
may result in additional tax revenues. 
Budget support has probably played a ma-
jor role since 2016 in how the value of the as-
sets of towns with county rights changed and 
will change, as the amounts granted have been 
continuously increasing. Investments carried 
out using this support will increase the value 
of fixed assets that belong to national assets by 
approx. Huf 121 billion in 2018, by Huf 
87 billion in 2019 and by Huf 22 billion in 
2020. Besides these supports, there are also 
sources co-financed by the Eu, but the ef-
fects of those are not covered by our study. 
These factors, with an average depreciation of 
Huf 50 billion, help keep the net asset value 
change in the positive range. This means the 
programmes contribute to the increase in the 
assets of local governments and to the increase 
in the quality of task performance.
ConClUsIon
After the debt consolidation, tasks and com–
petences changed considerably, and as a result, 
a major part of the local governments’ human 
public services became state responsibilities. 
The financing system was created accordingly, 
Table 5
target areas oF the modern cities programme 
(million huF)
development area 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 total
Health care development 7,000 2,210 4,016 6,039 9,993 29,258
Economic development 21,619 24,766 46,385
Human infrastructure development 5,210 20,837 19,213 11,378 635 57,273
Transportation development 3,800 5,933 7,283 7,327 2,840 27,182
Public services development 50 50
Cultural development 3,915 4,211 17,353 8,650 633 34,762
sports development 7,483 15,253 49,589 37,758 110,083
Tourism-related development 6,615 14,311 11,603 12,248 8,794 53,571
Asset policy 150 4,730 1,870 6,750
Urban development 8,109 9,995 10,483 4,182 29 32,797
Total 63,951 102,246 121,411 87,581 22,924 398,112
Source: own research, 2018
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and the regulatory environment changed 
significantly, allowing for rule-based budgetary 
practices. These include the introduction of the 
debt rule, which prevents the indebtedness of 
local governments by defining a debt-revenue 
ratio and providing for an approval procedure. 
The Modern cities Programme may give a 
strong local boost to towns with county rights, 
with most of it being co-financed by the Eu-
ropean union. The programme tried to take 
local needs into account, and when projects 
were created, the development goals of local 
governments were considered. The borrowing 
limit, however, may affect the implementation 
of the programme, as no new development 
may be started if debt exceeds the 50 percent 
of own revenues. Borrowing is automatically 
approved if the amount is meant to be used 
as own contribution or prefinancing in Eu 
developments. In the latter case it is bridge 
financing with coverage, and it may have a 
slightly negative effect on the results, because 
of the interests paid.  The debt of towns with 
county rights as established in this study 
is much lower than this limit, so when the 
required own contribution is secured, it 
cannot lead to the level of indebtedness that 
we saw earlier. In case of towns with county 
rights, the calculated borrowing limit index 
(the ratio of debt and equity) is currently low, 
below 10 percent, which means that with the 
current level of own revenue, it will not hinder 
the implementation of the programme and we 
do not expect financial risks.
Project management risks, on the other 
hand, may occur during the implementation, 
caused by the lack of capacity and high infla-
tion in construction. In this case the elements 
of the programme need to be constantly mon-
itored and modified, when necessary.
Note
1 csaba Lentner contributed to the study while participating in the Head Researcher Programme of the PADs 
foundation.
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